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“. . . each technical advance over the past
century has reaffirmed that repeated pat-
terns of structure and function are seen at
every level, from molecule to cell to cir-
cuit, and that many of these patterns are
common across cortical areas and species.
In this context, the concept of a canoni-
cal circuit, like the concept of hierarchies
of processing, offers a powerful unifying
principle that links structural and func-
tional levels of analysis across species and
different areas of the cortex”
(Douglas and Martin, 2010, p. 20).
The traditional microscopic assessment
by a neuropathologist is usually accom-
plished by first examining sampled sec-
tions at low magnification looking for
abnormalities of tissue characteristics and
then at higher magnification for abnor-
malities in the morphometry of individ-
ual cellular elements. The presence of
pathology is usually ascertained if cells
are missing, reduced in size or exhibit
aberrant staining properties. These cellu-
lar characteristics are not salient findings
in many psychiatric conditions such as
schizophrenia, autism and bipolar disor-
ders. Given the large number of symp-
toms that are localizable to the central
nervous system, the paradoxical absence
of neuropathology in many psychiatric
disorders makes us wonder whether we
are missing some abnormalities. In other
words, it is justifiable to consider whether
pathology in these conditions escapes the
level of resolution usually assessed by the
neuropathologist. Cerebral abnormalities
in many psychiatric conditions may not
be evident in single cells but rather in
units of neurons working together as cir-
cuitry. In this regard it is tempting to sug-
gest a chiasm between medical disciplines:
that neuronal abnormalities define the
pathology of neurological disorders (e.g.,
Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s disease) while
those involving circuitry define abnormal-
ities in psychiatric disorders (e.g., autism,
schizophrenia).
Some years ago the famous historian
of science, Thomas S. Kuhn wrote a pop-
ular book and bestseller entitled “The
Structure of Scientific Revolution” (Kuhn,
1970). In the book Kuhn made the case
that in order for science to advance it
needed a “paradigm shift,” a change in our
way of thinking or in our approach to a
problem. In the case of air travel, faster
airplanes are not the product of bigger
propeller engines that generate increasing
thrust; rather, different engines and phys-
ical principles account for advancement
in air travel. Many modern airplanes are
propelled by a gas turbine while rocket
engines use the thrust of their own com-
bustion exhaust gas. In similar fashion,
major advancements in science are not
the result of gradual increments applying
the same technology (e.g., bigger propeller
engines for air travel), but respond to the
introduction of a new way of thinking on
an older problem.
For many decades neuroscience has
been dominated by the cell theory of
Schwann and Schleiden that argued in
favor of the existence of a unique type
of cell exemplifying the holistic properties
of each individual organ. Acceptance of
this reductionist approach has been pro-
moted by the explanatory powers derived
from the work of such an eminent neu-
roscientist as Theodor Meynert who used
cellular details, as to both form and spa-
tial organization, in order to parcellate the
cerebral cortex. Santiago Ramón y Cajal
extended this neuronocentric view by pro-
viding evidence that favored what would
later on be called the “neuronal doctrine.”
In essence Ramón y Cajal argued that the
relationship between neurons was not one
of continuity but of contiguity.
The existence of a generalizable neu-
ron with a clear separation between its
functional components is an oversim-
plification. Countless number of neu-
rons exist within the brain differing from
one another in terms of size, shape,
location and neurotransmission. Contrary
to Ramón y Cajal’s law of dynamic
polarization the dendrites of some neu-
rons may occasionally generate an action
potential and axons my bear receptive
surfaces. Many neurons throughout the
animal kingdom lack axons while oth-
ers release their neurotransmitters through
non-synaptic sites (Casanova, 2010). The
plurality of neurons argues against their
designation as “individual” elements of the
brain (Casanova, 2010).
Although the anatomical evidence pre-
vailed during the ensuing decades it flew
against opposition emanating from phys-
iological studies. Sir Charles Sherrington
posited the interactive function of neural
elements, both excitatory and inhibitory,
the simplest of which was the reflex arc.
Still, even within a reflex arc, simple
actions require the coordinated efforts of
many neurons: “The reflex arc consisting
of just two neurons is an abstraction . . .
Even in systems such as the monosynap-
tic myotatic reflex in mammals, in which
there is one set of afferent and one set
of efferent neurons, many neurons are
involved” (Brown, 2001, p. 146).
Actions within the nervous system are
the result of neuronal ensembles, not of
single cellular entities. The concept of cell
assemblies acting at any given moment
within closed systems was popularized by
Donald Hebb in his famous book “The
Organization of Behavior” (Hebb, 1957).
According to this view, groups of neu-
rons are capable of acting as a closed
system and, depending on functional
requirements, its individuals components
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can participate in different cell assem-
blies. This interdependence of neurons is
evident both in vivo as well as in vitro.
Cultured neurons are usually derived
from stem cells that, depending on need,
are later on differentiated into neurons,
astrocytes or oligodendrocytes. In the case
of neurons scientist can manipulate the
culture media to enable cells to generate
synapses and myelination. Still, the initial
cellular density is critical to the survival
of the colony. This factor, called the seed-
ing density, usually varies between 80 and
300 cells/mm2. We can safely conclude
that neurons can’t survive and perform
their function in isolation. According to
Shepherd and Koch, “Nomatter how com-
plicated a single neuron may be, it cannot
play a role in the processing of information
without interacting with other neurons”
(Shepherd, 2004, p. 27).
It is clear that a single neuron does
not represent the holistic properties of
the brain nor can it represent the basic
unit of function for this organ. Only net-
works of neurons achieve this distinction.
According to the work of the American
psychologist and behaviorist Karl Spencer
Lashley these networks appear widely dis-
tributed throughout the brain. Lashley’s
work using rat’s brains failed to localize
the substratum of memory to a particu-
lar area of the brain. In effect, he was the
first person to spouse, based on his exper-
imental work, the principle of equipo-
tentiality. This principle antedated claims
from modern neuroplasticity experiments
that if certain parts of the brain are dam-
aged, other regions may take over the
function. Equipotentiality in this regard
suggests the presence of circuitry capa-
ble of performing the same generic oper-
ations throughout different parts of the
cortex.
The existence of repetitive circuits car-
rying generic types of operations within
the cerebral cortex has been well dis-
cussed within the field of neuroanatomy.
The nomenclature for this reiterative cir-
cuit has shifted through the decades being
called either a basic, local or canonical
circuit by different authorities (Shepherd,
1974, 1978; Rakic, 1975; Douglas and
Martin, 1991). Lorente de No was the first
researcher to propose the existence of ver-
tically oriented cellular elements within
the cerebral cortex that conjointly acted as
a circuit. Lorente de No described these
vertically arranged cellular aggregates as
follows: “All the elements of the cortex
are represented in it, and therefore it may
be called an elementary unit, in which,
theoretically, the whole process of trans-
mission of impulses from the afferent
fiber to the efferent axon may be accom-
plished” (Lorente de No, 1938). Not sur-
prisingly Lorente de No was honored by
the American Philosophical Society with
the first Karl Spencer Lashley Award in
1959.
It is noteworthy that most of Lashley’s
work was performed while at the Johns
Hopkins School of Medicine. It was in
this academic setting that Stephen Kuffler
employed microelectrodes to investi-
gate receptive fields of retinal ganglion
cells and their center-surround inhibi-
tion. Mountcastle and colleagues refined
Kuffler’s technique in order to proclaim
the landmark discovery of functional
cortical columns in the somatosensory
cortex of cats and monkeys. The columnar
organization proclaimed by Mountcastle
was confirmed in two early experiments
wherein slanted penetrations, i.e., an
angle of 45◦ to the surface of the brain,
demonstrated changes in modality as the
microelectrode transversed neighboring
tissue (Mountcastle, 1957).
Mountcastle’s work indicated the pres-
ence of vertically arranged cellular struc-
tures with similar electrophysiological
properties in different parts of the brain.
The findings suggested that the cerebral
cortex was more homogenous in its func-
tion than previously thought. According
to Bach-y-Rita, this meant that, “. . . any
part of the cortex should be able to pro-
cess whatever electrical signals were sent
to it, and that our brain modules were
not so specialized after all” (Doidge, 2007,
p. 18). Otto Creutzfeld believed that these
repetitive neocortical microcircuits pro-
cessed information in similar manner with
the resultant output depending on both
the source of information and modu-
latory influences peculiar to each brain
region (Creutzfeldt, 1977). The seminal
observations of Mountcastle’s were later
on expanded upon by two of his disci-
ples: Apostolos Georgopolous andMichael
Merzenich.
In the 1980s Apostolos Georgopolous
used a population vectormodel to describe
how groups of neurons act as voting
circuits by using their firing rates as bal-
lots to define the activity of individual
components (Georgopolous et al., 1988).
The final vote is tabulated by the vecto-
rial sum of each cell’s preferred orienta-
tion weighed by their firing rates. This
model enabled the encoding of programs
in monkeys that translated visual stimuli
into reach direction.
Michael Merzenich used microelec-
trode techniques to show the rapidly
changing nature of somatotopic and tono-
topic maps in response to environmen-
tal exigencies. His notion about how the
brain is capable of modifying itself (plas-
ticity) enabled him to lead the cochlear
implant team at UCSF (Merzenich et al.,
1977). Merzenich’s work has shown how
artificial stimuli can be used to retrain cor-
tical circuitry respective of brain region.
In this regard the plasticity of the brain
is dependent on the existence of “on-
demand” event-based processing circuits.
These cortical circuits are connected in a
series of nested positive and negative feed-
back loops called repetitive or recurrent
circuits (Douglas and Martin, 2010).
In recent years, Opris et al. (2012)
implemented the use of a unique con-
formal multielectrode recording array to
define the role of interlaminar circuitry
within prefrontal cortex minicolumns
in task-related target selection in non-
human primates. Activation of innate
prefrontal cortex minicolumns via the
encoded interlaminar correlated firing
sequences resulted in improved perfor-
mance on trials where specific informa-
tion was required depending on context
(Opris et al., 2013). The results indicate
interlaminar correlated firing during the
decision phase of target selection and pro-
vide a direct demonstration of real-time
minicolumnar processing during an exec-
utive function task. The discovery holds
important promise for using minicolum-
nar circuitry in cognitive prosthetics.
In summary, brain plasticity holds the
promise of restoring cognitive functions
even when brain tissue has been lost. The
use of neuroprosthetics is largely predi-
cated on the existence of generic circuits
which can be exapted by artificial stimuli,
or in the case of cognitive neuroprosthet-
ics, replaced by integrated circuits capable
of processing stimuli in a manner similar
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to that normally done by the diseased
area of the brain. In this regard, our abil-
ity to provide brain-machine interfaces is
grounded on a large body of knowledge
from pioneering anatomists and physiolo-
gists in regards to the microcircuitry of the
brain.
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